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FAIRNESS IN THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Many labour law scholars in the UK are disillusioned with recent judicial decisions by 
the House of Lords and Supreme Court on the contract of employment. The argument 
made in this article is that, although there are good reasons for disillusionment with 
the Johnson v Unisys progeny, there have nevertheless been potentially some very 
positive developments for employees in recent decisions. On procedural fairness, the 
High Court has read in principles of ‘natural justice’ to the employment contract, 
whereas both High Court and Court of Appeal decisions seem to see courts 
intervening, at least in some areas, in the employment relation also on the grounds of 
substantive fairness. It is suggested here that these recent cases are evidence of a 
nascent duty of ‘fairness’ in the contract of employment, and the case is made for 
explicit recognition of, and development of, this duty. A practical application is 
provided, to finish, with the topical phenomenon of so-called ‘zero hours contracts’. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article is written at a time of increasing dissatisfaction with judicial 
developments in labour or employment law. The benefits employment law scholars 
hoped to have gained from the Supreme Court’s decision in 2011 in Autoclenz Ltd v 
Belcher have not materialised at the same time as the Supreme Court has also 
chosen,1 controversially, in Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation 
Trust to extend the already heavily criticised so-called ‘Johnson exclusion zone’.2 
These developments have led even employment law scholars who were previously 
positive about developments at common law to change their previous assessments.3 
Unless, however, one takes the view that regulation of the employment relation in 
order to ‘protect’ employees is not necessary, if judicial developments and the 
common law are ruled out, that leaves two main options. Option one would be to turn 
                                                 
1 [2011] UKSC 41, [2011] IRLR 820 (where the benefit hoped to be gain was a ‘purposive’ approach 
[35] more generally. Cf, eg, Smith v Carillion (JM) Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 209, [2015] IRLR 467). 
2 [2011] UKSC 58, [2012] IRLR 129. 
3 Compare, for example, M.R. Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford: OUP, 2003) 
and N. Countouris, The Changing Law of the Employment Relationship (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) 
with M.R. Freedland and N. Kountouris, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations (Oxford: 
OUP, 2011) and same authors, ‘Common Law and Voice’ in A. Bogg and T. Novitz (eds), Voices at 
Work: Continuity and Change in the Common Law World (Oxford: OUP, 2014). Compare also J. 
Riley, Employee Protection at Common Law (Sydney: Federation Press, 2005) with same author in 
footnote immediately below. 
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from the courts to the legislature. 4  The difficulty with option one is its lack of 
likelihood.5 Admittedly, the current Government and previous Government have been 
activist in passing new legislation pertaining to labour and employment law.6 Of this 
new legislation, probably the two most important changes have been the introduction 
of employment tribunal fees in 2013 and the Trade Union Act 2016.7 The former has 
led to a number of judicial review challenges and that which Underhill LJ in the Court 
of Appeal has described as a ‘startling’ drop in the number of applications to 
employment tribunals, whereas the latter makes it considerably harder for trade 
unions lawfully to organise industrial action. 8  However, even with a different 
Government, the viability of option one might be questioned. It is noticeable, for 
example, how little the New Labour Government changed the law on industrial 
action, despite many years of various expert international committees advising 
Governments in the UK that domestic strike law falls short of international standards 
and is too strict.9 Option two would be instead to advocate a return to widespread 
collective bargaining, but that too seems unrealistic as membership of trade unions 
continues to stagnate, if not decline.10  
The argument made in this article is that even though there is understandable 
frustration with decisions made at House of Lords and Supreme Court level, 
simultaneously there are some potentially very positive and interesting developments 
of the common law contract of employment going on at lower court level, both before 
and after Johnson v Unisys Ltd.11 Because of the decisions made at House of Lords 
                                                 
4 J. Riley, ‘The Future of the Common Law in Employment Regulation’ (2016) 32 IJCLLIR 33, at 44: 
‘… those of us who earnestly desire the development of more egalitarian labour laws will need to 
direct our attention to the lobbying of parliaments. Perhaps that is the better solution’. (Also, M. 
Freedland in M. Freedland (general ed), The Contract of Employment (Oxford: OUP, 2016, at 20.) 
5 This article was written before the General Election of 2017. 
6 Described as, collectively, ‘the biggest change to employment law since the introduction of the right 
to claim unfair dismissal more than 40 years ago’ (D. Renton and A. Macey, Justice Deferred: A 
Critical Guide to the Coalition’s Employment Tribunal Reforms (Liverpool: IER, 2013). 
7 The Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order SI 2013/1893. 
8 R (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor (No.3) (Equality and Human Rights Commission 
intervening) [2015] EWCA Civ 935, [2015] IRLR 911 [75]. Previous, failed, applications: [2014] 
EWHC 218 (Admin), [2014] IRLR 266; [2014] EWHC 4198 (Admin), [2015] IRLR 99.  
9 On which, see for example, T. Novitz and P. Skidmore, Fairness at Work: A Critical Analysis Of The 
Employment Relations Act 1999 And Its Treatment Of "Collective Rights" (Oxford: Hart, 2001). 
10 DBIS, ‘Trade Union Membership 2015: Statistical Bulletin’ (May 2016). 
11 [2001] UKHL 13, [2001] IRLR 279 [28]. In terms of ‘positive and interesting developments’, 
reference should also be made to more progressive recent statutory developments, such as the 
introduction of shared parental leave (Children and Families Act 2014 Part 7), the new national living 
wage (National Minimum Wage (Amendment) Regulations 2016), generally the Modern Slavery Act 
2015, and new gender pay gap reporting for larger companies (Equality Act 2010 (Gender Pay Gap 
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and Supreme Court level, they have been to a large extent overlooked. Lest it be 
stated that these decisions would simply be reversed if they were to reach the 
Supreme Court, it is worth remembering the comparable history of the implied term 
of mutual trust and confidence. By the time Malik v BCCI SA reached the House of 
Lords in 1997, it had been repeated and used so often before industrial tribunals and 
the Employment Appeal Tribunal that the House of Lords accepted it, verbatim, and 
moreover did so enthusiastically. 12  The view of this author is that, should it be 
needed, rather than rely on option one (legislation) alone, it might be both easier and 
more realistic to persuade a High Court judge or judges to recognise the implications 
of existing judgments. Case law, to date, tells us that there is no implied term in the 
contract of employment that the employer will treat employees ‘reasonably’. 13 
Waddams, back in 1976, writing on contract law generally, made the argument that a 
doctrine of unconscionability should be acknowledged, because ‘[o]nly with open 
recognition of the true principle can the courts begin to develop rational criteria and 
guidelines that will satisfactorily explain their decisions and offer a useful guide for 
the future.’14 In the same way as for Waddams there were pockets of decisions where 
courts were effectively already applying unconscionability, the argument made here is 
there are already the clear seeds in case law of what this author will characterise as an 
implied term, in law, of ‘fairness’ in the contract of employment. One of the aims of 
this article is to draw out the implications of these existing judgments and to suggest 
what explicit recognition of an implied duty of fairness would mean. At the minute, 
the cases where there is a latent implied duty of fairness tend to protect highly 
remunerated employees who have a larger than normal degree of bargaining power 
with their employer. Arguably they have less need for this implied term.15 A benefit 
of explicit recognition of an implied term of fairness in the contract of employment 
would mean that it could also reach lower paid, more vulnerable employees for whom 
                                                                                                                                           
Information) Regulations 2017). (On the coherency of Coalition Government reforms, see B. Hepple, 
‘Back to the Future: Employment Law under the Coalition Government’ (2013) 42 ILJ 203.)  
12 [1997] IRLR 462. (On ‘enthusiastic’ endorsement, see D. Brodie, ‘Beyond Exchange: The New 
Contract of Employment’ (1998) 27 ILJ 79, 80. Also Johnson, ibid, [18].)  
13 Eg Post Office v Roberts [1980] IRLR 347 (EAT). (More recently, against expansion of implied 
terms in law: Crossley v Faithful & Gould Holdings Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 293, [2004] IRLR 377.) 
14 ‘Unconscionability in Contracts’ (1976) 39 MLR 369, 391. 
15 ‘[F]or employees such as this defendant [an equity derivatives broker], who are highly valued and 
most generously rewarded, the inequality of bargaining power, which is recognised to apply in many 
employment relationships, simply does not exist, or, at any rate, does not exist to such a degree…’ 
(TFS Derivatives Ltd v Morgan [2004] EWHC 3181 (QB), [2005] IRLR 246 [83]). 
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it is surely more the job of labour law to protect: if the rationale of labour law does 
indeed remain the classical aim of counteracting ‘inequality of bargaining power’.16 
There follows six substantive parts to this article. The first part explains the 
context of increasing dissatisfaction among labour law scholars with recent judicial 
developments. The following five parts set out this author’s different interpretation of 
recent judicial developments. The second part focuses on developments with regards 
to procedural fairness in the common law contract of employment, where there have 
been some very obvious positive developments. The third part is a discussion of 
whether there have been comparable developments in terms of substantive fairness. 
The fourth part considers how to rationalise these existing pockets of cases, with the 
fifth part developing an implied term of fairness. The sixth part provides a possible 
practical application. The example of so-called ‘zero hours contract workers’ is used. 
This part of the article considers if and how judges at common law could potentially 
alleviate instances of exploitation of these workers. Zero hours work is also a useful 
example of sometimes the unwillingness of the legislature, meaningfully, to intervene. 
  
 
2. DISSATISFACTION WITH RECENT JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Some labour law scholars are hesitant generally about the prospects of judges at 
common law protecting the interests of employees. They cite the traditional affinity of 
the judiciary with employers, in terms of their class and/or background and also in 
terms of, arguably, their suspicion of trade unions.17 Reference is also made to the 
lingering hangover of the old master and servant law in the ‘contract of service.’18 
Other scholars have been more positive about the common law, but have become 
dissatisfied due primarily to two cases at the House of Lords and Supreme Court. 
                                                 
16 ‘The main object of labour law has always been, and we venture to say will always be, to be a 
countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is inherent and must be 
inherent in the employment relationship’ (P. Davies and M. Freedland (eds), Kahn-Freund’s Labour 
and the Law (London: Stevens, 3rd ed, 1983) 18. (But see also main text to n 168). 
17 Eg K.W. Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 3rd ed, 1986); B. 
Hepple, ‘Restructuring Employment Rights’ (1986) 83 ILJ 69; S. Anderman, ‘The Interpretation of 
Protective Employment Statutes and Contracts of Employment’ (2000) 29 ILJ 223. 
18 Eg K. Ewing (ed), Working Life: A New Perspective on Labour Law (London: IER, 1996) 46-47 
(‘Such terms are a legacy of an earlier era of “master and servant” relations. The rigid hierarchical 
model of employment which they presuppose has no place in a modern system of labour law’). 
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Both of these cases have been written about extensively elsewhere.19 In Johnson v 
Unisys Ltd, the House of Lords held that the ‘implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence’, which is a default term read into all contracts of employment and will be 
discussed more below, is not applicable to the manner of dismissal.20 This was on the 
grounds primarily that to allow this development at common law would be to trespass 
on the equivalent statutory cause of action (unfair dismissal, as contained at Part X 
Employment Rights Act 1996) and possibly to overshoot it. For example, there is a 
cap on the maximum amount of compensation a successful claimant can obtain for 
unfair dismissal under statute, but - in theory at least - no limit to the amount of 
damages that an employee could sue for at common law in contract and tort. 21  Lord 
Steyn provided a powerful dissent on his reasoning, although ultimately agreed the 
claim failed. When initially given, the decision in Johnson would seem to have been 
one of the most criticised judgments in modern employment law history.22 For those 
commentators who were immediately sceptical of the majority’s reasoning (with 
reasoned judgments provided by Lord Hoffmann, Lord Nicholls and Lord Millett), the 
overriding concern was that the Lords seemed to introduce a new, limiting, principle 
of statute as a ‘ceiling’ with regards to comparable developments at common law 
rather than, as thought before, a ‘floor’ or a springboard.23  
Johnson was followed shortly by another decision of the House of Lords in 
Eastwood v Magnox Electric Plc; McCabe v Cornwall County Council, which gave 
                                                 
19 For discussion of Johnson, see materials at n 22 below. On Edwards, see dedicated commentary, for 
example, at L. Barmes, ‘Judicial Influence and Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust and Botham v Ministry of Defence (2013) 42 ILJ 192; C. Barnard and L. Merrett, 
‘Winners and Losers: Edwards and the Unfair Law of Dismissal’ (2013) 72 CLJ 313; K. Costello, 
Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital - Parliamentary Intention and Damages caused by 
Maladministration of a Contractual Dismissal Procedure’ (2013) 76 MLR 134. 
20 Johnson, n 11 above. 
21 The maximum amount of the ‘compensatory award’ (Employment Rights Act 1996, s 124(1)) for the 
year beginning 6 April 2016 is the lower of £78,962 or 52 weeks’ pay for the employee concerned. 
22 Eastwood v Magnox Electric Plc; McCabe v Cornwall County Council [2004] UKHL 35, [2004] 
IRLR 733 [43]: ‘Since Johnson was decided more than two years ago, there has been a great deal of 
comment on this decision by academic and practising labour lawyers: see Professors Deakin and 
Morris, Labour Law, 3rd edn, 2001, 410–411, 418–419; Professor Freedland, The Personal 
Employment Contract, 2003, 162–167, 303–305, 342–345,362– 364; Professor Freedland, 2001, 30 ILJ 
309; Professor Collins, Claim for Unfair Dismissal, 2001, 30 ILJ 305; Professor Bob Hepple QC and 
Gillian Morris, The Employment Act 2002 and the Crisis of Individual Employment Rights, 2002, 31 
ILJ 245, 253; Douglas Brodie, Legal Coherence and the Employment Revolution, 2001, 117 LQR 604, 
624–625; Lizzie Barmes, The Continuing Conceptual Crisis in the Common Law of the Contract of 
Employment, (2004) 67(3) MLR 435. Making due allowance for differences in emphasis between the 
writers on the subject, there is apparently no support for the analysis adopted in Johnson’ (emphasis 
added). 
23 Eg S. Deakin and G.S. Morris, Labour Law (Oxford: Hart, 6th ed, 2012) 447-448. 
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the formal imprimatur to the so-called ‘Johnson exclusion zone’.24 Here, the House of 
Lords (with almost the same panel) held that Johnson did not apply to all elements of 
the disciplinary process when there was an eventual dismissal, but rather to the 
moment of dismissal. This meant that if there was a pre-existing, independent cause 
of action prior to the dismissal, a claim for breach of the implied term of mutual trust 
and confidence could still be brought. Thus was the case in this particular instance: 
these conjoined appeals involved harassment and otherwise poor behaviour during the 
course of a disciplinary procedure prior to the actual dismissals. Lord Nicholls, who 
gave the lead judgment, acknowledged that deciding whether action fell inside or 
outside of the ‘Johnson exclusion zone’ would be difficult and could lead to 
duplication of proceedings, but concluded rather than resolve this judicially, 
Parliament should ‘urgently’ visit the matter.25 Parliament did not.  
  The more recent case, and more troubling case still, is the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust; 
Botham v Ministry of Defence. 26  It had generally been assumed until this point, 
including by the Court of Appeal in Edwards, that Johnson was applicable to implied 
terms.27 A ‘majority’ in Edwards, however, held that the reasoning in Johnson was 
also applicable to express terms, in the form of contractually incorporated workplace 
disciplinary procedures. The basic argument was that workplace disciplinary 
procedures are, and have always been, linked with statutory unfair dismissal law and 
therefore, first, they are not ‘ordinary’ express terms and, second, because of this link, 
Parliament must have ‘occupied the field’ here too.28 As a result, damages would not 
be available unless the contract was explicitly to state that the parties intended 
damages would be available, which is of course going to be unlikely.29 There are a 
number of criticisms that can be directed, cumulatively, towards the judgment in 
Edwards. 
First, the facts of Edwards do not demonstrate the self-evident link between 
workplace disciplinary procedures and unfair dismissal law which the majority 
assumes there is. The disciplinary procedure in question there was a collectively 
agreed procedure that went far beyond the relatively low demands of statutory unfair 
                                                 
24 Eastwood, n 22 above. 
25 Ibid [33] (and [30]). 
26 Edwards, n 2 above. 
27 [2010] EWCA Civ 571, [2010] IRLR 702 (and by Lady Hale in the Supreme Court). 
28 Edwards, n 2, [27]-[37] (Lord Dyson) (and [90]-[94] (Lord Mance)).   
29 Ibid [39] (and Lord Mance at [94]). 
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dismissal law and the relevant ACAS Code of Practice. It could not be described as 
only having been introduced to avoid findings of unfair dismissal.30 Second, with 
respect, the decision has strange remedial consequences. As noted by the dissenting 
Lady Hale (and supported in this respect by the partly dissenting Lord Kerr and Lord 
Wilson), it is ‘[puzzling] as to how it can be possible for an employee with a 
contractual right to a particular disciplinary process to enforce that right in advance by 
injunction but not possible for him to claim damages for its breach after the event’.31  
Third, and to explain the highlighting of the word ‘majority’ above, it may not 
be clear what is the ratio.32 On the face of it, there seems to be a majority: Lord 
Dyson, Lord Walker, Lord Mance and Lord Phillips, with all four agreeing that both 
claims should fail. On closer inspection, however, although Lord Dyson regarded 
Lord Phillips as supporting his judgment, arguably the reasoning of the latter is 
sufficiently different not to count as support.33 Leaving aside then Lord Phillips as an 
isolated seventh Justice, the main majority trio would be supported by the partial 
dissenters on the extension of the Johnson exclusion zone, but would not be supported 
by them on the non-availability of damages without express words, leaving on the 
latter point potentially three in the majority and three in the minority. Fourth, by 
analogy with Eastwood, one might feel sympathy with the view of Lord Kerr and 
Lord Wilson that, even if Johnson is applicable, the situation in Edwards, albeit not 
Botham, would in any case fall outside the exclusion zone and should therefore have 
been actionable. A fifth and final criticism might be the express (Lord Phillips) and 
implicit (majority and partial dissenters) revival of the much earlier wrongful 
dismissal case of Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd,34 when the House of Lords in Malik 
had seemed to start the process of distinguishing if not overruling Addis.35  
This section has concentrated on the three key decisions of Johnson, Eastwood 
and Edwards by the House of Lords and Supreme Court. It is interesting in this 
respect to reflect on academic reception of these three decisions. Although Lord Steyn 
                                                 
30 [6]: ‘His case was that his contract of employment entitled him to have a panel including a clinician 
of the same medical discipline as himself and a legally qualified chairman.’ 
31 Edwards, n 2 above, [122] (and Lord Kerr at [154]: ‘curious’). 
32 See Barmes, n 19 above; also H. Collins, ‘Compensation for Dismissal: In Search of Principle’ 
(2012) 41 ILJ 208, 212-215 and 218. 
33 Eg Edwards, n 2 above, [79]. 
34 [1909] AC 488 (HL). (On the revival of Addis in Edwards, see eg A. Bogg and M. Freedland in 
Freedland (2016), n 4 above, ‘The Wrongful Termination of the Contract of Employment’.) 
35 Johnson, n 11 above, [70]: ‘… is not easy to defend and may no longer be the law after Malik’, but 
Edwards, n 2 above, [85] (and Johnson [1999] IRLR 90 (CA)).  
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was able to comment in Eastwood that there had been no positive commentary about 
Johnson, rehabilitation of Johnson is notable in more recent literature. 36  Davies, 
Bogg, Barnard and Merrett have all now agreed with Johnson on the point of 
‘constitutional principle’.37 By contrast, criticism of Edwards has not abated and it 
does not seem that it will abate. Bogg, for example, has memorably described 
Edwards as a ‘mess’, as a ‘blot on the legal landscape’, and as requiring overruling at 
the earliest opportunity.38  
 
 
3. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
 
This jurisprudence at the House of Lords and Supreme Court has understandably 
occupied the attention of labour lawyers. However, one of the main suggestions and 
observations of this article is that there have been some potentially very promising 
and interesting developments in terms of procedural fairness in recent cases at 
common law on the contract of employment. This section will concentrate on two 
particular developments, although there are others that could also be discussed under 
this heading, such as the endorsement if not encouragement given to applications by 
employees for ‘injunctive relief’ by the Supreme Court in Société Générale v Geys.39  
In earlier cases, it was clearly stated that, at common law, principles of natural 
justice are not imported into the contract of employment. 40  The first such 
development that will be discussed in this section is the litigation in Yapp v Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office. Yapp is significant because Cranston J at first instance 
held that, even though (unusually) Mr Yapp had an express right to ‘fair treatment’ as 
contained in his letter of appointment, there was also an implied term of fair 
                                                 
36 Eastwood, n 22 above. See A.C.L. Davies, ‘The Relationship between the Contract of Employment 
and Statute’ in Freedland (2016), n 4 above; Bogg and Freedland, n 34 above; A. Bogg, ‘Common Law 
and Statute in the Law of Employment’ (2016) CLP forthcoming; Barnard and Merrett, n 19 above.   
37  Specific wording of ‘constitutional principle’ used in Bogg (2016) ibid. Also discussion of 
‘constitutional basis’ in Bogg and Freedland, ibid, 550-553. (On the relationship generally between 
common law and statute, see eg J. Beatson, ‘The Role of Statute in the Development of Common Law 
Doctrine’ (2001) 117 LQR 247; A. Burrows, ‘The Relationship between Common Law and Statute in 
the Law of Obligations’ (2012) 128 LQR 232.) 
38 ‘Express Disciplinary Procedures in the Contract of Employment: Parliamentary Intention and the 
Supreme Court’ (2015) 131 LQR 15, 21. 
39 [2012] UKSC 63, [2013] IRLR 122 [73] (however, Hendy v MOJ [2014] EWHC 2535 (Ch), [2014] 
IRLR 856 [85]-[87]). As another possible example, on an implied term to a grievance procedure: 
Goold (W A) (Pearmak) Ltd v McConnell [1995] IRLR 516 (EAT). 
40 Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 (HL) 65; McClory v Post Office [1993] IRLR 159 (HC). 
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treatment.41 The implied term of fair treatment was said to derive from the implied 
term of mutual trust and confidence. 42  As the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence is itself of course, to invoke well known contract law distinctions, an 
implied term in law as opposed to an implied term in fact, this ‘derivation’ would 
suggest that the implied term of fair treatment was for the High Court also an implied 
term in law.43 The significance of this is that it would presumably be applicable to all 
employees as a ‘standardised’ or ‘default’ term contained in all contracts of 
employment.44 Yapp subsequently proceeded to the Court of Appeal.45 Whereas the 
High Court had found that there were two breaches of contract and that damages were 
available for one of those breaches of contract, the Court of Appeal only upheld one 
breach of contract and, moreover, found that damages would not be recoverable as 
they were too remote. Indeed, much of the subsequent academic focus on Yapp has 
been to criticise the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in relation to its treatment of 
tortious principles on psychiatric injury.46 The contractual obligation of fair treatment 
has largely been overlooked.47 But, even though the Court of Appeal disagreed with 
the High Court in important respects, it did not disagree with Cranston J’s implied 
term of fair treatment. If anything the Court of Appeal did not even seem to find this 
point contentious. On this point, all that Underhill LJ stated was in parenthesis: 
‘though such a duty would no doubt have been implied in any event: see Chhabra…’ 
without any further discussion.48 
In contrast to this brevity by the Court of Appeal, Cranston J in the High Court 
elaborated on the duty of fair treatment, both express and implied in Mr Yapp’s 
contract. Cranston J set out what he memorably termed as ‘the golden thread through 
the case law on fair treatment’.49 Although the High Court found there were two 
breaches of contract (first, the unlawful withdrawal of Mr Yapp from his post as UK 
                                                 
41 [2013] EWHC 1098 (QB), [2013] IRLR 616 [117]: two possible sources of the duty of fair treatment 
cited (and, for this author, comments about duty of fairness are just as relevant to the duty of fairness as 
an implied term, given the lack of detail relating to the express term. Cranston J discussed the duty of 
fair treatment in the abstract: [82]). 
42 Ibid [117]. 
43 Eg Malik, n 12 above, [53]. 
44 Ibid. On implied terms in the contract of employment generally, see recently H. Collins, with chapter 
of same name, in Freedland (2016), n 4 above. 
45 [2014] EWCA Civ 1512, [2015] IRLR 112. 
46 Eg D. Brodie, ‘Risk Allocation and Psychiatric Harm: Yapp v Foreign and Commonwealth Office’ 
(2015) 44 ILJ 270. 
47 Cf D. Cabrelli, ‘Liability and Remedies for Breach of the Contract of Employment at Common Law: 
Some Recent Developments’ (2016) 45 ILJ 207. 
48 Yapp, n 45 above, [41]. 
49 Yapp, n 41 above, [82]. 
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High Commissioner to Belize, as upheld by the Court of Appeal and; second, which 
was reversed by the Court of Appeal, unlawful application of the disciplinary 
procedure), Cranston J identified three problems under the duty of fair treatment on 
the facts at hand. These were: the lack of a preliminary investigation before taking the 
decision to withdraw, not giving Mr Yapp sufficient information to allow him 
properly to respond to the allegations against him before a decision was to be taken, 
and the potential bias, at least in these circumstances, of the same person undertaking 
the fact finding investigation and the disciplinary hearing. In comparison to earlier 
cases, on three separate occasions, Cranston J invoked specifically the language of 
natural justice.50 For example, it was concluded that ‘what happened was in breach of 
a basic principle of natural justice.’51 
Whilst the reference to and importation of natural justice is important in itself, 
it is also significant as a comparison to the statutory law of unfair dismissal. A 
number, albeit not all, of early cases under the statutory unfair dismissal jurisdiction 
state that a modified version of natural justice only is applicable to the workplace.52 
That modified version of natural justice is less extensive that Cranston J’s ‘golden 
thread’. 53 In case it might be said that these unfair dismissal cases are older and 
therefore may be less reliable over time, the most recent unfair dismissal cases at 
Court of Appeal level stress that workplace disciplinary proceedings are not ‘mini 
trials’, which would seem implicitly to endorse the reasoning in this respect of those 
older unfair dismissal cases.54 It might hence be suggested that if comparing common 
law and statute, the former in Yapp appears to provide the more strong protection of 
procedural fairness. 
This conclusion is, however, subject to two caveats. The first is to what extent 
the Johnson exclusion zone prevents the common law from playing a useful role. A 
                                                 
50 Ibid [62], [82], [131] (albeit [62] was an argument by Mr Yapp). 
51 Ibid [131]. 
52 Khanum v Mid-Glamorgan Area Health Authority [1978] IRLR 215 (EAT) (quoting and agreeing 
with, [20]-[21]: ‘“What then are the requirements of natural justice in a case of this kind? First, I think 
that the person accused should know of the nature of the accusation made; secondly, that he should be 
given an opportunity to state his case: and thirdly, of course, that the Tribunal should act in good faith. 
I do not myself think that there is really anything more”’); Taylor v Alidair Ltd [1978] IRLR 82 (CA); 
Rowe v Radio Rentals [1982] IRLR 177 (EAT) [14]; Ulsterbus Ltd v Henderson [1989] IRLR 251 
(CA). Also Haddow v Inner London Education Authority [1979] ICR 202 (EAT), but 209. Cf, 
however, Bentley Engineering v Mistry [1978] IRLR 436 (EAT) and Louies v Coventry Hood and 
Seating Co Ltd [1990] IRLR 324 (EAT). 
53 Compare, for example, the second breach of contract as found in Yapp with unfair dismissal law in 
Slater v Leicestershire Health Authority [1989] IRLR 16 (CA) and, more recently, in Adeshina v St 
George's University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2015] IRLR 704 (EAT). 
54 Adeshina, ibid, [17] (and references therein); Yapp, n 45 above, [69]. 
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preliminary question is whether the Yapp implied term, moving forwards, would be 
limited to disciplinary proceedings (although in Yapp itself the term was, of course, 
also express). Certainly it would seem naturally suited to disciplinary proceedings or 
potential disciplinary proceedings (where an employee is accused of some 
misdemeanour, giving them the opportunity to defend their name). However, the 
Yapp implied term could potentially extend more broadly. Notably, when describing 
the ‘golden thread’ of fair treatment, Cranston J spoke of ‘those liable to be affected 
by a decision’ per se.55 Employees can of course be liable to be affected by other 
types of decision, such as if the employer is considering making redundancies, or 
considering transferring the business, or considering a change to terms and conditions. 
One can imagine, however, that it would be more likely to be invoked, in practice, in 
the disciplinary proceedings situation. The question then becomes if disciplinary 
proceedings as a whole fall within the Johnson exclusion zone. Some statements in 
Edwards do seem to start to suggest the latter (in spite of Eastwood).56 This would 
mean that Yapp itself would be a rare instance where the implied term of fair 
treatment could have application to disciplinary proceedings because in this particular 
instance there had been no dismissal at the time. Rather, after his suspension was 
lifted, Mr Yapp commenced periods of sick leave; he was registered with his 
employer’s ‘corporate pool’ but never deployed, and ultimately retired. On the other 
hand, there are signs that others judges view the ‘zone’ more narrowly. The claimant 
in Monk v Cann Hall Primary School was ‘marched off the premises’.57 If asked to 
give a hypothetical example of conduct falling within the Johnson exclusion zone, 
this is probably the type of scenario that would be given. While, as might be 
predicted, the lead judgment stated ‘the manner in which it was carried out was 
probably too closely related to the dismissal itself to escape the Johnson exclusion 
area’, Underhill LJ added a short judgment devoted to the exclusion zone point, 
stating it was actually ‘very arguable’ that such conduct fell outside of the zone.58  
The second is the effect of the judgment by the Court of Appeal in Yapp, 
which is mildly ironic in light of the reference to Underhill LJ immediately above. It 
has already been noted that the Court of Appeal only upheld one of the two breaches 
                                                 
55 Above n 49. 
56 Casual references in Edwards, n 2 above, to the disciplinary process as inside the zone: ‘It arises 
from what was said by the trust as part of the dismissal process’ ([57]) and ‘As it is, their claims are for 
damages arising from what was said in the course of the dismissal process’ ([60]) (and [99]). 
57 [2013] EWCA Civ 826, [2013] IRLR 732. 
58 Ibid [23] and [32]. 
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of contract as found by the High Court. Specifically, the Court of Appeal did not find 
it problematic that there was a duplication of roles, with the same person undertaking 
the fact-finding investigation and disciplinary hearing. Perhaps more worrying 
generally, Underhill LJ remarked ‘I would regard the process now recommended by 
ACAS as representing good practice but not as a requirement of fairness in every 
case.’59 This is even though the ACAS Code ‘provides basic practical guidance to 
employers, employees and their representatives’ (emphasis added).60 Another concern 
is that the Court of Appeal found that the notorious ‘band of reasonable responses’ 
approach from statutory unfair dismissal law was applicable when deciding if there 
had been a breach of contract.61 The band of reasonable responses is infamous for 
providing a great amount of leeway to employers.62 If Mr Yapp’s withdrawal from 
post would only be unlawful if it was a ‘decision that no reasonable employer could 
have taken’, this would severely limit the protective capabilities of the common law. 
However, although Underhill LJ did endorse the band of reasonable responses 
approach, this author would argue that Underhill LJ was incorrect to do so. The Court 
of Appeal referred in support to Coventry University v Mian, but that itself was a case 
where there was scant reasoning; in comparison to the fully reasoned decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Buckland v Bournemouth University Higher Education 
Corporation in 2010 where it was specifically decided that the ‘band’ approach from 
statute is not applicable when deciding, at common law, whether there has been a 
breach of contract.63 Moreover, there is ample authority more generally stating that 
courts should take an ‘objective’ approach when deciding if there has been a breach 
of the employment contract, meaning in sum that judges should decide for themselves 
if there has been a breach, rather than simply ‘reviewing’ the employer’s decision.64 
Therefore, even though the claim in Yapp lost before the Court of Appeal 
whereas it succeeded before the High Court, this author would argue that Yapp is still 
significant. The Court of Appeal did not disapprove of the High Court’s ‘duty of fair 
                                                 
59 Yapp, n 54 above. 
60 Wording of ‘basic’ used in Code, to describe Code, at pages 1 and 3. (Blackburn v Aldi Stores Ltd 
[2013] IRLR 846 [22]: ‘These codes are a reliable indication of the employment context.’) 
61  Yapp, n 45 above, [61], as criticised by Brodie, n 46 above, 272-3. (On ‘band of reasonable 
responses’, see Iceland Frozen Foods Ltd v Jones [1982] IRLR 439 (EAT)). 
62 Eg Haddon v Van den Bergh Foods Ltd [1999] IRLR 672 (EAT). 
63 Mian [2014] EWCA Civ 1275 [23] (‘no dispute’); Buckland [2010] EWCA Civ 121, [2010] IRLR 
445. 
64 Eg Buckland, ibid; Mattu v University Hospitals Coventry and Warwickshire NHS Trust [2012] 
EWCA Civ 641, [2012] IRLR 661 [68]-[69]; British Heart Foundation v Roy (Debarred) 
UKEAT/0049/15/RN (16 July 2015) [6]. 
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treatment’ and, if anything, strengthened its status by linking it to the Chhabra 
decision by the Supreme Court (even though Chhabra had not been mentioned by 
Cranston J). 65  In terms of whether the ‘band of reasonable responses’ approach 
applies when deciding if there has been a breach of this duty, it is hoped that a future 
court would recognise that Mian was not fully reasoned whereas Buckland was. 
Finally, Underhill LJ’s narrow interpretation of the Johnson exclusion zone in Monk 
gives hope that the exclusionary zone may not always prove too much of a problem to 
employees relying on this implied term in a disciplinary or even in a dismissal 
scenario. But the duty of fair treatment, as conceived by Cranston J, potentially it 
seems could apply more broadly than that scenario anyway.  
The second development to be discussed under the heading of procedural 
fairness is another recent decision by the High Court. Stevens v University of 
Birmingham is a remarkable case for two reasons.66 First, it shows the willingness of 
at least some of the judiciary to intervene even when, on the face of it, it would seem 
very difficult for a court to intervene, where they perceive an employer to have acted 
‘patently unfairly’.  
The disciplinary procedure applicable to Professor Stevens, which was itself a 
matter of contention, stated that ‘s/he shall have the right to be accompanied by a 
member of Staff or a trade union representative of his or her choice’. As found by 
Andrews J, this clear express wording meant there was no room for a term implied in 
fact that he could be accompanied by somebody else.67 The issue was that Professor 
Stevens was not a union member and due to the nature of his specific role, he had no 
colleagues either willing or suitable to accompany him to a misconduct investigatory 
meeting.68 Even though it was not possible to imply a term in fact, the High Court 
nevertheless ruled in the claimant’s favour, holding it would be a breach of the 
implied term of mutual trust and confidence if the University were not to allow him to 
be accompanied by a different, equivalent representative. The threshold for 
                                                 
65 [2013] UKSC 80, [2014] IRLR 227 (where injunctive relief was granted, requiring the employer to 
restart the disciplinary procedure before proceeding). 
66 [2015] EWHC 2300 (QB), [2015] IRLR 899. 
67 Ibid [87]. 
68 ‘[C]ogent (and unchallenged)’: [97]. 
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intervention, which will be discussed in more detail below, was patent unfairness: ‘it 
would have been patently unfair to force him to attend the interview alone.’69  
Second, Stevens is significant because it goes against the idea that judges will 
necessarily henceforth refuse to innovate at common law when that would be to 
proceed beyond statute. As noted in the judgment, the choice of companion at this 
stage of the University’s disciplinary procedure mirrored the statutory right to 
accompaniment at section 10 Employment Relations Act 1999.70 Applying Johnson, 
one would have expected the High Court to rule there would be no unlawfulness in 
the University not relaxing its rules: the choice of companions under the statutory 
right to accompaniment is exhaustive (trade union representative or colleague) and in 
any event only applies to formal disciplinary and grievance hearings, as opposed to 
the situation here which was an investigatory meeting which the University had 
expressly stated was not disciplinary.71 Indeed, obiter elsewhere by Lord Hope would 
support that assumption.72 Stevens is thus an example showing that, at least outside of 
a dismissal scenario, if there is a situation of ‘patent’ procedural unfairness, a court 
may be willing to intervene at common law, first, even when that goes beyond the 
express wording of the contract and, second, even if that enlarges upon equivalent 
statutory rights. The next question is whether courts would be willing to intervene 
also to protect interests of substantive fairness. 
 
 
4. SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS 
 
It has often been observed that judges are much more comfortable intervening in 
employment disputes where there has been some procedural irregularity than if there 
is any alleged substantive unfairness. This is because it means they can pay more 
deference to the employer’s legitimate prerogative to run its business as it chooses, 
which is a positive not least because of the limited expertise and capacity of courts. 
Judges are also more accustomed to questions of procedural fairness from the 
                                                 
69 Ibid [92] and [97]. ([93]: ‘Yet in this case, the perception has been created that the university has an 
advantage over Professor Stevens because it has enlisted the support of an external HR consultant, who 
will attend, and… whereas it is forcing him to go into the meeting without any support of that nature.’) 
70 Ibid [78]. 
71 Section 10(3); on formal disciplinary and grievance procedures: Skiggs v South West Trains Ltd 
[2005] IRLR 459 (EAT). 
72 R (on the application of G) v Governors of X School [2011] UKSC 30, [2011] IRLR 756 [95]. 
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structure of judicial review proceedings. This section takes as its basic definition that 
procedural unfairness occurs when there is some flaw in the process leading to a 
decision. 73  The merits of the decision itself are not reviewed. In comparison, 
substantive fairness is where a court is concerned with the outcome. The argument 
made in this section is that even though it is sometimes said that judges will not 
intervene to protect interests of substantive fairness,74 there are clear pockets of cases, 
at least in this author’s view, where judges in employment disputes have and do 
intervene on substantive grounds. The issue then becomes to see if there is a good 
reason why judges are willing to intervene on grounds of substantive unfairness in 
some cases whereas not in others. 
One case that could obviously be mentioned here would be Transco (formerly 
BG plc) v O’Brien.75 The Court of Appeal in O’Brien upheld the ruling that it was a 
breach, again of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, to offer all 
employees bar the claimant a revised contract of employment. The flaw was 
substantive: due to a mistake on the employer’s part, Mr O’Brien had not been paid 
an enhanced redundancy package when really he should have been. The employer had 
mistakenly thought he was a temporary employee when he was in fact a permanent 
employee. In other words, his claim was not the typical procedural argument from 
redundancy unfair dismissal cases that his redundancy was flawed, for example, due 
to a lack of consultation or concerns about the selection procedure utilised. In fact, no 
such typical ‘procedural’ flaws are mentioned in any of the judgments in O’Brien.76 
O’Brien is normally referred to as an example of the ‘positive’ possible 
dimension of the implied term of trust and confidence.77 Pill LJ rejected the argument 
put forward by the employers: ‘[i]t may be applied to enforce existing terms and to 
regulate existing terms, but not to create’ new rights.78 This author would add that this 
was significant as in Malik v BCCI SA, which was the case where the House of Lords 
first discussed (and endorsed) the implied term of trust and confidence, Lord Nicholls 
                                                 
73 In the employment context, in his seminal work on unfair dismissal, Collins also draws a distinction 
between procedural and substantive fairness (Justice in Dismissal: The Law of Termination of 
Employment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992)). 
74 Notably D. Brodie, ‘Voice and the Employment Contract’, 342-3, in Bogg and Novitz, n 3 above. 
75 [2002] EWCA Civ 379, [2002] IRLR 444. 
76 ‘The only reason provided to exclude Mr O’Brien from the scheme was that BGP did not know that 
he was an employee’ (emphasis added) ([2001] IRLR 496 (EAT) [22]). 
77 Wording of ‘positive’ used by Court of Appeal and EAT, ibid; also by D. Brodie, The Employment 
Contract: Legal Principles, Drafting and Interpretation (Oxford: OUP, 2005) [5.07]. 
78 O’Brien, n 75 above, [16]. 
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had stated ‘failure to improve is one thing, positively to damage is another.’79 Riley 
goes the stage further of suggesting that the Court of Appeal also implicitly endorsed 
the formulation by the employment tribunal that the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence includes a ‘duty to treat employees in a fair and even handed manner’.80 
Her reasoning is that ‘he [Pill LJ] refused to declare that the employment tribunal was 
in error’.81 This author would agree that O’Brien is a significant decision, but not 
necessarily with that interpretation.82 The employment tribunal’s decision was more 
likely held to be correct in spite of that error (‘It is submitted that the wrong test has 
been applied. In my judgment, even if that is right it does not affect the outcome of 
this appeal’) and the Court of Appeal, moreover, in that particular case, emphasised 
the need to apply Malik ‘unvarnished’.83 O’Brien is also significant for the purposes 
of this article because it postdates Johnson. If Johnson represents the start of a new 
more restrictive era, if indeed it is possible to conceive of judicial eras, this is another 
example of where expansion and development of the common law has still 
occurred.84 
Despite the academic attention given to it, O’Brien is arguably, however, 
somewhat of an isolated decision. It is only referred to relatively infrequently in 
subsequent case law. In comparison, there are two other true pockets of cases where 
courts in employment disputes do intervene to protect matters of substantive fairness. 
As well, the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd 
might be added.85 All members of the Supreme Court in this split decision held that 
both limbs of Wednesbury unreasonableness were applicable to disputes about the 
exercise of a contractual discretion and for Lady Hale,86 the second limb explicitly 
assesses substantive fairness: ‘[t]he second focusses upon its outcome – whether even 
though the right things have been taken into account, the result is so outrageous that 
                                                 
79 Malik, n 12 above, [28]. 
80 Riley, n 3 above, 78-80. 
81 Ibid 80. 
82 Eg University of Nottingham v Eyett [1999] IRLR 87 (HC) [23]-[24]. 
83 O’Brien, n 75 above, [19] and [24].  
84 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that judicial progressivism tends to come in 
fits and starts. (One might cite, for these purposes, the short gap between Malik, n 12 above, and 
Johnson, n 11 above.) 
85 [2015] UKSC 17, [2015] IRLR 487. 
86 Ibid [30], [53], [103]. 
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no reasonable decision-maker could have reached it’ (in contrast to the first limb, 
which ‘focusses on the decision-making process’) (emphasis added).87  
The first such pocket of cases are the so-called cases on bankers’ bonuses. 
Lest it be thought that the focus of this article thus far has mainly been on decisions at 
first instance, most of the cases in this category are decisions by the Court of 
Appeal.88 This category of cases involves the employer promising a bonus and then 
either not paying the bonus at all or paying a lower level of bonus. There are two 
surprising features here: first, the ratio of success by ‘bankers’ in these cases and,89 
secondly, in some of the cases, that the employer’s promise to pay a bonus when 
stated to be discretionary and made in an informal and skeletal fashion has even been 
held to be legally binding.90  
It should be emphasised that the argument is not that the courts already in 
every case reassess the precise levels of bonuses awarded to employees.91 Looking at 
the overall pattern of cases, rather the argument is threefold: first, courts generally 
intervene in an activist way to hold that promises to pay a bonus are legally binding in 
the first place.92 Second, they do sometimes review the adequacy of a bonus. More 
particularly, they are much more likely to intervene and to set the level of a bonus 
themselves if no bonus has been paid, as opposed to, third, if the claimant is 
challenging the amount of a bonus already paid.93 It is the logic between one and 
                                                 
87 [24]. (Cf potentially Patural v DG Services (UK) Ltd [2015] EWHC 3659 (QB), [2016] IRLR 286 
[61], but subsequently, Hills v Niksun Inc [2016] EWCA Civ 115, [2016] IRLR 715.) 
88  Mallone v BPB Industries plc [2002] EWCA Civ 126, [2002] IRLR 452; Horkulak v Cantor 
Fitzgerald International [2004] EWCA Civ 1287, [2004] IRLR 942; Keen v Commerzbank AG [2006] 
EWCA Civ 1536, [2007] IRLR 132; Attrill v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 229, [2011] 
IRLR 613; Attrill v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 394, [2013] IRLR 548. 
89 Eg, most recently, Hills, n 87 above (but cf in 2014 and 2015: Brogden v Investec Bank Plc [2014] 
EWHC 2785 (Comm), [2014] IRLR 924 and Patural, n 87 above; but n 93 below). (The generic term 
‘banker’ is used to capture the complicated different specialisms within the financial services industry.) 
90 Eg Clark v Nomura International plc [2000] IRLR 766 (HC) (‘is not guaranteed in any way’) (and, 
similarly, Clark v BET plc [1997] IRLR 348 (HC): ‘shall be reviewed annually and be increased by 
such amount if any as the board shall in its absolute discretion decide’); n 88 above: Horkulak (‘may in 
its discretion’... ‘however the final decision shall be in the sole discretion of the president of CFI…’; 
Attrill (as discussed in main text to n 95). 
91 Keen, n 88 above, [39]; Attrill (2013), n 88 above, [94]. 
92 Above n 90. 
93 A decision to award no bonus is more likely to be deemed irrational than a decision to award some 
bonus. Compare eg success in Nomura (n 90), BET (n 90), Mallone (n 88), Horkulak (n 88), Attrill (n 
88) (for those with ‘individual guaranteed bonuses’), with lack of success in eg Keen (n 88) and 
Patural (n 89). Also, D. Brodie, The Contract of Employment (Edinburgh: Thomson 2008) [9.04]. 
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three that is arguably problematic: if three undermines the reasons for intervening at 
one.94  
As an example of judicial reasoning for intervening at one (and as an example 
of activist intervention at one): Attrill v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd highlights possible 
unfairness to the affected employees if the employers were to be able to renege on 
their promise to pay bonuses.95 Even though the bank was soon to be sold and there 
was ‘widespread uncertainty about their future’, staff would appear to have stayed on 
the basis of this undertaking.96 There, the announcement of a minimum bonus pool of 
€400 million was made at a ‘town hall meeting’. Notably, no further details as to 
individual entitlement or method of calculation were given at that time.97 Although 
the primary finding by the Court of Appeal was that this communication satisfied a 
unilateral variation clause in the employees’ contracts, doctrinally as a matter of 
general contract law perhaps surprisingly, it also found as an alternative ground for 
the claimants that ‘there was in any event a binding contractual promise resulting 
from the terms of the promise and the circumstances in which it was made.’98 
As approved in the subsequent authorities, Clark v Nomura International plc 
sets out there are two stages, which must be kept distinct, in the bonus cases.99 These 
two stages apply once that seemingly lower threshold, of deciding whether there is a 
contractually binding promise to pay a bonus, has been met. The first stage in Clark is 
that the court should apply a test of irrationality or perversity to the exercise of the 
discretion. At this stage, the courts do not ‘substitute their own views’ but rather only 
review the employer’s decision. 100  Only if that first stage is surpassed, then the 
second stage is for the court to conclude what the level of the bonus should have been 
if the discretion had been correctly exercised. At this point, unlike at the first stage, 
the court will ‘[put] itself in the position of the employer’, hence the need to 
distinguish between the two stages.101 A further distinction would appear to have been 
drawn at this second stage by the Court of Appeal in Commerzbank AG v Keen, with 
                                                 
94 Keen, n 88 above, [38]: ‘… along with some reservations about the direction in which the law was 
developing in this area’. Cf main text to n 152. 
95 Attrill, n 88 above. Also Mallone, n 88 above, [44] and Horkulak, n 88 above, [46]. 
96 Ibid (2013) [14], [19] and [135]. 
97 Eg Attrill (2011), ibid, [28]-[31]. 
98 Attrill (2013), n 88 above, [142]. Arguments by the respondents in relation to a lack of intention to 
create legal relations, lack of consideration, lack of certainty and lack of acceptance were all rejected. 
99 Nomura, n 90 above, [40]. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Above n 99. 
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the criteria seemingly added that the employee will need to make an ‘overwhelming’ 
case for intervention when, rather than no bonus being paid, some bonus has been 
paid and the challenge is to the amount.102 To conclude on this part, the reason for 
including the bankers’ bonuses cases in this section is because these cases 
demonstrate intervention on substantive grounds: firstly, in holding sometimes vague 
promises to pay bonuses to be legally binding; and, secondly, if no bonus is paid or, 
more rarely, if the higher threshold of ‘overwhelming’ is surpassed when a bonus has 
been paid, the cases show that courts are able to look at the facts of a given case and 
themselves determine the appropriate rate of a bonus.103 Moreover, intriguingly for 
the later parts of this article, this substantive intervention on bonuses comes in 
relation to pay. 
The second ‘pocket’ of cases would be litigation assessing the validity of 
restrictive covenants in contracts of employment, where the language of 
‘reasonableness between the parties’ is explicitly used, and there is discussion of the 
adequacy of consideration.104 On the other hand, these cases have also been described 
as ‘anomalous’. 105  However, the standards said to be applied in these cases of 
‘oppressive’ and ‘completely inadequate’ are interesting as a parallel to the standard 
of ‘patent unfairness’ which was discussed previously under the heading of 
procedural fairness.106 
 
 
5. RATIONALISATION 
 
In the more expansive judgment on the obligation of fair treatment in Yapp, the High 
Court stated that, if implied, it derived from the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence.107 Similarly, the breach in Stevens was a breach of the implied term of 
                                                 
102 Keen, n 88 above, [59] (see Brodie, n 93 above, on whether the test of ‘overwhelming’ is different 
from irrationality.) 
103 On the standard to be applied: Nomura, n 99 above: ‘balance of probabilities’; ‘without unrealistic 
assumptions’. 
104 Reuse Collections Ltd v Sendall [2014] EWHC 3852 (QB), [2015] IRLR 226 [71]. Summary of 
applicable principles eg in Merlin Financial Consultants Ltd v Cooper [2014] EWHC 1196 (QB), 
[2014] IRLR 610 [62]-[63]. 
105 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269 (HL) 295. 
106 Eg Deakin and Morris, n 23 above, 379-80 (with reference to Proactive Sports Management Ltd v 
Rooney [2011] EWCA Civ 1444, [2012] IRLR 241). ‘Oppressive’ used in Esso, ibid. 
107 Above n 42. 
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mutual trust and confidence.108 In comparison, some of the bankers’ bonuses cases 
reject the application of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence and suggest a 
different implied term: an implied term not to act capriciously, arbitrarily or 
irrationally with regards to matters of remuneration.109 Finally, the Court of Appeal in 
Yapp, in its very brief discussion of the duty of fair treatment, referred to paragraph 
37 of Chhabra v West London Mental Health NHS Trust, which in turn mentioned 
‘the obligation of good faith in the contract of employment’.110 Thus far, this article 
has documented developments at common law in procedural and substantive fairness. 
Which implied term or terms are applicable is important both for explaining the 
current case law and for predicting future developments in the relevant jurisprudence. 
The two main contenders for explaining these decisions would be, as 
foreshadowed above, first, the implied term of mutual trust and confidence and, 
second, good faith.111 This section first considers the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence. As seen above, the cases on procedural fairness specifically refer to this 
implied term. Even leaving aside the bankers’ bonus cases; with reference to the 
decisions discussed under the heading of substantive fairness, it was also found that 
there was a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence in O’Brien.112 It 
is appropriate to begin with the trust and confidence implied term because of its wider 
significance to modern employment law. In practical terms, it is key, for example, to 
the operation of the statutory law of constructive dismissal, but it is also said to be 
important, normatively, outside of that context and more generally, for sending a 
message to employers as to what behaviour is and is not appropriate in today’s 
employment relation. 113  As memorably described by Freedland in The Personal 
Employment Contract (and similarly argued by Brodie in a series of influential 
articles), it is ‘undoubtedly the most powerful engine of movement in the modern law 
of the employment contract’. 114 The standard formulation of this implied term, as 
                                                 
108 Stevens, n 66 above, [103]. 
109 Trust and confidence meant something quite different in Keen, n 88 above ([47]: ‘The probable 
reason for this is that Mr Keen wants more than adequate reasons to be supplied in respect of the 
bonuses that he has received’). 
110 Above n 48; above n 65. 
111 If there is even a difference between the two. 
112 Above n 75. 
113 Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1978] IRLR 27 (CA). Freedland (2003), n 3 above, 159. A 
‘duty of fairness’ could equally send a powerful message. 
114 Freedland (2003), n 3 above, 166 (and generally 154-168). (Eg D. Brodie, ‘The Heart of the Matter: 
Mutual Trust and Confidence’ (1996) 25 ILJ 121; n 12; ‘Legal Coherence and the Employment 
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endorsed by the House of Lords in Malik, is that it imposes an obligation, on both 
employers and employees, not to ‘without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself 
in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of 
confidence and trust between employer and employee.’115 However, a slight concern 
is expressed here as to whether trust and confidence is the best way of analysing 
recent developments. 
First, and more fundamentally, the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence is sometimes described as mainly or even wholly procedural. 116  The 
previous section of this article, in comparison, demonstrated developments at 
common law where courts have intervened in the employment relationship more 
substantively. Second, if one is arguing for an expansion of the common law or that 
there has already been an expansion at common law, possibly it may not be the wisest 
term to invoke.117 The main issue in Johnson was whether the trust and confidence 
term could apply to the manner of a dismissal and it was held it could not. Hence a 
limit has already been placed on the, if Lord Steyn was correct, natural development 
of the implied term. Admittedly other subsequent cases, after Johnson, do seem still 
to expand this implied term, such as Stevens and O’Brien as discussed earlier. 
However, the point is that a ‘brake’ has still been applied in relation to this implied 
term, and at the highest level.118 Third, at a time when employment tribunal fees act 
as a disincentive to litigation before employment tribunals and, as a result, more 
employees may be turning to the common law, the language of the implied term of 
trust and confidence could be queried. Without the possible assistance of an 
Employment Judge, the formulation as endorsed in Malik may not be the most 
comprehensible on its face for claimants.119 This perhaps results from its origins: this 
                                                                                                                                           
Revolution’ (2001) 117 LQR 604; ‘Mutual Trust and Confidence: Catalysts, Constraints and 
Commonality’ (2008) 37 ILJ 329.) 
115 Malik, n 12 above, [54], [57] and [70] (note: some parts of the judgment use the wording ‘and’ 
instead of ‘or’). 
116 Eg Brodie (2008), n 114 above, 341-345 (341: ‘Had the employer followed due process he would 
not have lost’). 
117 Including after events in Australia with the rejection of the implied term of trust and confidence by 
the High Court in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker [2014] HCA 32. (Also Ahmed v Amnesty 
International [2009] IRLR 884 (EAT) and Leach v Office of Communications [2012] EWCA Civ 959, 
[2012] IRLR 839.) 
118 Freedland (2003), n 3 above, 166. 
119 Drysdale v Department of Transport [2014] EWCA Civ 1083, [2014] IRLR 892 [49].  
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wording was first suggested by counsel and then simply repeated by an Employment 
Appeal Tribunal.120 Multiple cases afterwards then replicated said formula. 
The second contender is good faith. Both the advantage and the disadvantage 
of regarding recent cases as examples of good faith is good faith’s link to general 
contract law. On the positive side, it does seem that ‘good faith’ can incorporate 
concerns about substantive fairness as well as procedural fairness.121 There is also a 
rich broader literature about good faith in the general contract law context, which 
employment lawyers could draw upon.122 Another advantage could be good faith’s 
broader personal scope. Certain cases still seem reluctant to expand the implied term 
of trust and confidence to working persons who do not meet the strict definition of 
‘employee’, 123  whereas good faith is applicable to a far broader range of 
‘relationships’.124 
In turn, the disadvantage of regarding these cases as examples of good faith 
would be that they could be susceptible to negative developments in ordinary contract 
law, in two ways. First, and more radically, there is the fate of Yam Seng Pte Ltd v 
International Trade Corp Ltd, where Leggatt J controversially held that there was an 
implied term, in fact, of good faith in a distributorship agreement, but discussed good 
faith more generally too. 125  Some subsequent commercial contract cases have 
endorsed Yam Seng, whereas others have doubted it and others still have distinguished 
it.126 If recent employment law cases are characterised as subsets of ‘good faith’ and 
if Yam Seng were stated to be incorrect at Court of Appeal or Supreme Court level, 
which is not beyond the realms of possibility, this could, indirectly, potentially 
jeopardise the current employment law cases too.127 Second, looking at Yam Seng, it 
                                                 
120 Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew [1979] IRLR 84 (EAT) [10]. 
121 Eg H. Collins, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’ (1994) 14 OJLS 229. 
122 For an example of an excellent discussion in the context specifically of employment, see A.L. Bogg, 
‘Good Faith in the Contract of Employment: A Case of the English Reserve?’ (2010-2011) 32 
Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 729. 
123 Cf Freedland (2003), n 3 above, 168-171. But Tullett Prebon plc v BGC Brokers LP [2011] EWCA 
Civ 131, [2011] IRLR 420 [45]. 
124 Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB), [2013] 1 CLC 662 
[143]; Bristol Groundschool Ltd v Intelligent Data Capture Ltd [2014] EWHC 2145 (Ch) [196].  
125 Ibid [132] (and generally [120]-[155]). 
126 Eg approved in Bristol Groundschool (n 124 above) and in D&G Cars Ltd v Essex Police Authority 
[2015] EWHC 226 (QB); ambiguity in Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v Compass Group UK 
and Ireland Ltd (trading as Medirest) [2013] EWCA Civ 200, [2013] BLR 265; doubt in Greenclose 
Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc [2014] EWHC 1156 (Ch), [2014] 1 CLC 562 [150] and in MSC v 
Cottonex Anstalt [2016] EWCA 789 [45]. 
127 Cf Leggatt J referred to employment as an example of where there is already a duty of good faith 
‘implied by law’, at [132]. (Also Chhabra, n 65 above). 
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might be concluded that the current employment law cases go further in any event. 
Although Leggatt J noted that the requirements of good faith are context dependent, 
he also stated that good faith meant a duty of ‘honesty’ as well as ‘fidelity to the 
parties’ bargain’.128 Cranston J’s principles of natural justice in Yapp would seem 
plenty more extensive. 
Leggatt J’s extended discussion of good faith in Yam Seng might also cause 
employment lawyers to question if good faith, normatively, is even suitable. 
Employment contracts are often described as ‘take it or leave it’ contracts. With the 
emphasis on typically rather than always, they are typically drafted by employers and 
are simply presented to employees, with little scope for extended negotiation. If good 
faith is about ensuring ‘fidelity to the parties’ bargain’, in the employment context 
(depending on how broadly one interprets the word ‘bargain’), this could mean 
ensuring fidelity specifically to the employer’s view of the bargain.129 Kahn-Freund 
had famously stated that the aim of labour law is to offset the inherent imbalance of 
bargaining power between employers and employees. 130 On this analysis of good 
faith, rather than offset, it could potentially contribute to imbalances of bargaining 
power. 
Collins and Mantouvalou have recently argued for an implied term that 
employers should respect the dignity and autonomy of their employees.131 It would be 
linked to ‘a legal requirement of respect for the human rights of employees.’132 They 
also, however, acknowledge that this is an argument of how the law should 
prospectively develop, rather than a description of current cases. Accordingly, they 
give the example of an employee dismissed for having a tattoo of which their 
employer disapproves, and argue that this likely would not constitute a breach of the 
implied term of trust and confidence, because ‘the employer is acting openly in what 
it regards as its own best interests’, however likely would breach an implied term of 
dignity and autonomy.133 While this author would agree that it would be a positive 
development if the common law were to recognise such a new implied term, the 
different suggestion made here is that courts are already using the language of fairness 
                                                 
128 Yam Seng, n 124 above, [136]-[142]. 
129 Whether one looks at the written documents or also at the ‘reality’ (Autoclenz, n 1 above; also 
Carmichael v National Power plc [2000] IRLR 43 (HL)). 
130 Above n 16. 
131 ‘Human Rights and the Contract of Employment’ in Freedland (2016), n 4 above, 205-6. 
132 Ibid 205. 
133 Ibid. 
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in some employment law cases. It is notable that Lord Nicholls, for the conventional 
majority in Eastwood, referred on a number of occasions to an implied term in the 
employment contract to ‘act fairly’.134 Perhaps surprisingly, that same language is 
also used to a certain extent in Johnson. 135  As recognised by the High Court 
subsequently, ‘post-Imperial cases have included references to fairness.’136 Moreover, 
the developments under the heading of procedural fairness and substantive fairness 
discussed thus far in this article would be coterminous with a duty of fairness. ‘Fair 
treatment’ was the implied term in Yapp, there would have been ‘patent unfairness’ 
without intervention in Stevens and there was also reference to ‘fair play’, Mr O’Brien 
was essentially treated unfairly by not being offered the enhanced package when he 
was entitled to it, courts would review the rate of a bonus when the amount paid was 
unfair in the sense of being irrational or perverse, and restrictive covenants may not 
be valid if they are unfair to the extent of being ‘oppressive’. 
This section thus concludes with the view that, rather than trust and 
confidence or good faith, a preferable ‘portmanteau’ term would simply be 
fairness. 137 There is of course a vast jurisprudential literature on the meaning of 
‘fairness’ and ‘fair play’, but at the same time, fairness is similar to ‘reasonableness’ 
from negligence law in having also an intuitive, simple and comprehensible, 
meaning.138 There is a detailed debate elsewhere about the virtue of the implied term 
of trust and confidence as the leading implied term in the employment contract, in 
comparison to it being one of a number of more specific implied terms. 139 This 
section, however, refers back again to Waddams’ work on unconscionability.140 If 
there are ‘pockets’ of intervention here and there, this leads to two dangers: first, 
arbitrariness and gaps, and, second, what could potentially be as dangerous to 
respondents, uncertainty as to when any intervention will occur. 
                                                 
134 Eastwood, above n 22, [11], [15], [28]-[29], [33].  
135 Ibid [49]. 
136 Prudential Staff Pensions Ltd v The Prudential Assurance Company Ltd [2011] EWHC 960 (Ch) 
[142] (but cf on substantive fairness, also in [142]). 
137 Malik, n 12 above, [13]. Freedland (2003), n 3 above, 186-195, suggests an ‘overarching principle 
of fair performance and management’, which is also simply referred to as a ‘principle of fairness’. 
(Where, however, Freedland might disagree with this author is on the ambit of ‘fairness’: compare 
Freedland, eg 227, with the argument to be made in the next section on pay.) 
138 Eg, the duty of ‘fair play’ as developed by Rawls (eg ‘Justice as Reciprocity (1971)’ in S. Freeman 
(ed), John Rawls: Collected Papers (London: Harvard University Press, 1999)). ‘Fair play’ was 
mentioned in Stevens, n 66 above, [74]. (Another alternative is ‘fair dealing’, as discussed by Collins in 
‘Implied Terms: The Foundation in Good Faith and Fair Dealing’ (2014) CLP 1.) 
139 Eg D. Cabrelli, ‘The Implied Duty of Mutual Trust and Confidence: An Emerging Overarching 
Principle?’ (2005) 34 ILJ 284. 
140 Above n 14. (Also Freedland, n 137 above.) 
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6. A DUTY OF FAIRNESS? 
 
To summarise the argument of this article thus far, recent cases on the contract of 
employment were reviewed and it was found that courts have made some possibly 
quite radical developments in the area of procedural fairness but interestingly have 
also intervened, either implicitly or expressly, on grounds of substantive fairness in 
other cases. An attempted rationalisation was then made. It was considered whether 
these recent cases are examples of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence at 
work or an obligation of good faith in play. It was argued that these cases are better 
understood as examples of a nascent duty of ‘fairness’ in the contract of employment, 
with that language expressly being used in dicta by the House of Lords. The 
conclusion was that this nascent implied term or duty should henceforth be explicit.141 
It will also be noted that most of the cases discussed so far have involved 
higher earning employees. The concerns of these higher earning employees have been 
with, for example, not being afforded an extensive workplace disciplinary procedure 
as promised to them or being paid a bonus at a lower than expected level. In 
comparison a worker in precarious employment is less likely to want principles of 
natural justice to apply in the unlikely event that disciplinary proceedings are started 
against them and more likely to want a decent overall pay package or regular hours of 
work. This section makes an argument that a duty of fairness needs also to work in 
favour of lower earning and lower skilled working persons. As noted in 
Commerzbank AG v Keen, albeit in a different context, but nevertheless still true: ‘[i]t 
is trite but salutary to observe that the courts must not discriminate between the rich 
and poor employee.’142 
One obvious way in which such a duty of fairness could help lower earning 
and lower skilled working persons would be in relation to remuneration. For example, 
if it could create an implied right to pay in circumstances where currently there is no 
pay (to be discussed in the next section) or if it could even potentially allow courts to 
review the main rate of remuneration in the same way as they can already review the 
                                                 
141 The wording ‘implied term’ and ‘duty’ are used interchangeably in Yapp (including under the 
contractual analysis). 
142 Above n 88, [109]. 
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rate of a bonus. Preliminary support for the latter idea can be found in the 1970s case 
of FC Gardner Ltd v Beresford, where the claimant had resigned in response to the 
lack of a pay rise compared to her colleagues, and the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
discussed the same standard that would subsequently apply in the bonus cases of 
irrationality.143 If that is preliminary support, the argument of this section is more 
clearly that courts should also be able to review too, where appropriate, the main rate 
of pay. If the reason for judicial intervention in the bankers’ bonuses cases was to 
prevent abuse of discretion, intervention in other areas of remuneration should also be 
possible.144 Now that over two thirds of the workforce do not have their pay affected 
by a collective agreement, with contracts of employment frequently characterised as 
‘take it or leave it’ contracts, the main rate of pay too is set unilaterally by 
employers.145 Nor is it an answer to respond that a bonus in the bankers’ cases was an 
ancillary aspect of pay: 146  those cases predate new regulation of bonuses in the 
financial sector and judges expressly comment that a bonus makes up a large 
proportion of the claimant’s wage packet.147 Moreover, an argument can be made 
that, if anything, there are more compelling reasons to intervene outside of the 
bankers’ context, if Cox J was correct to note that ‘bankers’ typically have a higher 
degree of bargaining power in comparison to other employees.148 
However, the suggestion that courts could potentially review the main rate of a 
wage or salary would clearly be contrary to the views of most academic lawyers and 
statements in various cases. Typically, there are three reasons given why this would 
not be possible. First, the cases simply do not allow such intervention;149 second, it 
would be too difficult and courts do not have sufficient expertise and; third,150 it 
would invite litigation and may lead to an abundance of vexatious claims.151  
                                                 
143 [1978] IRLR 63. (But Murco Petroleum Ltd v Forge [1987] IRLR 50 (EAT).) 
144 Brogden, n 89 above, [100]. 
145 DBIS, n 10 above, 35: 27.9 per cent of employees had their pay affected by a collective agreement. 
146 Powell v Braun [1954] 1 All ER 484 (CA), 486: (then) ‘quantum meruit’ applicable to additional 
remuneration, as well as to basic remuneration. (See also n 159 below.) 
147 Eg Keen, n 88 above, [47]. (Subsequently Capital Requirements Directive IV 2013/36/EU, arts 92-
94.)  
148 Above n 15. 
149 Eg Murco, n 143 above, [15]: ‘a wild leap forward’ (on suggested implied term to give a pay rise). 
Also relatively frequent references in equal pay cases denying the idea of ‘fair wages’ (eg Strathclyde 
Regional Council v Wallace [1998] IRLR 146 (HL), Glasgow City Council v Marshall [2000] IRLR 
272 (HL) and Villalba v Merrill Lynch & Co Inc [2006] IRLR 437 (EAT)), but those comments were 
made specifically in the context of describing equal pay legislation. (For instance in Strathclyde: ‘As I 
have said, the long title of the Act renders such an argument impossible’, at [21].) 
150 Admittedly, as a fourth possible point, bonuses were discretionary in the cases discussed above, but 
arguably there may also be a way to read a set amount subject to implied terms: see discussion at text 
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While these all valid concerns, this section will argue that there are 
qualifications that can be added to each. As to the first point, there is indeed a 
longstanding line of cases where courts do determine the rate of remuneration.152 
These are those admittedly rather rare cases where the contract is silent as to the rate 
of pay and it is to be implied that there will be payment. Recently, the Court of 
Appeal in Stack v Ajar-Tec Ltd upheld the principle that courts, in these 
circumstances, will establish ‘a reasonable sum for work done’. 153  This line of 
decisions is also interesting for the second point about impracticality. The trial judge 
in Stack identified a ‘reasonable sum’ with reference to the rate of pay of a 
comparable employee already working for the same company.154 By contrast, Lord 
Atkin in the older case of Way v Latilla asked if there was ‘trade usage’ as to the 
calculation of remuneration.155 Another alternative is presented in Driver v Air India 
Ltd, where the Court of Appeal fixed the rate of payment for overtime by looking at 
previous practice by the same employer.156 Whilst none of these ways are perfect, as 
there may be no comparable employee, there may be no industry practice or, 
foreseeably, all employees at the grade at that company or in that sector are paid 
badly, they do offer some guidance to a court.157 These situations from the cases - 
inequitable pay between colleagues, a sudden drop in pay, an informal promise of 
more pay, or possibly also ‘trade usage’ – possibly also give an indication as to when 
it might be more likely that remuneration could be found to be ‘patently unfair’.158  
When suggesting an explicit duty of fairness, the analogy that is drawn in this 
article is with existing cases, meaning the threshold for breach would be similarly 
high. 159  The standards examined earlier were: ‘patent unfairness’ (Stevens), 
                                                                                                                                           
to n 179. See also Gardner, n 143 above. A more radical example would be Stevens, n 66 above, where 
the express term, at least there, was seemingly not a limit. 
151 Eg ‘deference factors’ as discussed in A.C.L Davies, ‘Judicial Self-Restraint in Labour Law’ (2009) 
38 ILJ 278, 289-291; Davies (2015), n 36 above; Brodie, n 93 above; Brodie, n 74 above, 349-50 
(‘Herculean task’, at 350); Allied Dunbar (Weisinger) Ltd v Weisinger [1988] IRLR 60 (HC) [32]. 
152 Eg Way v Latilla [1937] 3 All ER 759 (HL); Powell, n 146 above. (Described as ‘well-known cases’ 
in Stack v Ajar-Tec Ltd (2011) UKEAT/0527/10/CEA [12].) 
153 [2012] EWCA Civ 543, [14] (subsequent CA decision at [2015] EWCA Civ 46, [2015] IRLR 474). 
154 Stack (2015), ibid, [18]. 
155 Way, n 152 above, 764. 
156 [2011] EWCA Civ 830, [2011] IRLR 992. 
157 By analogy with Waddams, n 14 above: ‘Given the open recognition of a general principle of 
unconscionability one would expect the courts to develop guidelines. There is every reason to think 
that they would be fully equal to this task.’ 
158 See eg discussion of ‘reasonable expectations’ in Brogden, n 89 above, [115]-[117]. 
159 The language used in the Consumer Rights Act (‘CRA’) 2015 is, similarly, ‘significant imbalance’ 
(s 62(4)). This article does not, however, draw a parallel with the CRA, because, first, the CRA is not 
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oppressive or completely inadequate (restrictive covenants), irrationality and 
perversity (bonus cases). These seem to be relatively similar: they each set a tall 
threshold. Indeed, if there is to be a criticism, it is that they set too tall a threshold. 
Setting a high standard for breach would, however, seem to be necessary, if not to 
allay the floodgates concern, but to align the standard here with the implied term of 
mutual trust and confidence, which in turn would be needed as many of the existing 
cases, as discussed above, are currently analysed as trust and confidence cases. The 
authorities are clear that, in order to find a breach of the implied term of trust and 
confidence, the conduct must be likely to ‘destroy or seriously damage’, not just 
damage, the relationship of trust and confidence: described by the Court of Appeal as 
a ‘severe’ test.160 
On the other hand, if thinking about the lower paid, the next section consider 
how precisely the suggested duty of fairness could potentially help one particular and 
topical set of precarious workers: so-called ‘zero hours contract workers’.161 
  
 
7. A PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that ‘zero hours contracts’ were one of the 
defining features of the General Election in 2015.162 Yet, first, it seems there is still 
not agreement even on the basics: on the name to be given to this type of work (‘zero 
hours work’ or ‘zero hours contract work’, with potentially significant differences 
between the two), its definition (even within Government, notably after a statutory 
                                                                                                                                           
applicable to contracts of employment (s 61(2)) and, second, this article does not follow its division of 
‘main subject matter’ and ancillary subject matter (s 64(1)). 
160 Gogay v Hertfordshire County Council [2000] IRLR 703 [55]. 
161 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting equal pay as another possible example for 
exploring the suggested duty of fairness. There was alleged inequality of pay between colleagues in 
Gardner (and in Murco), n 149 above, but no indication of a gender element. There would be an 
obvious Johnson type issue (as discussed in Part 2) if it were attempted to use the suggested duty of 
fairness to bypass the (many) limitations of equal pay legislation. If it is any indicator, the SC in 
Abdulla v Birmingham City Council [2012] UKSC 47, [2013] IRLR 38 did allow the claims in question 
to proceed before the High Court even though the claimants were out of time before the employment 
tribunal. On the other hand, this was based on an interpretation of now section 128(1) Equality Act 
2010. There are other obvious differences between equal pay and unfair dismissal legislation: equal 
pay claims are contractual (now Equality Act 2010, s 66) and statute expressly envisages equal pay 
claims can be brought before either employment tribunals or civil courts (now Equality Act 2010, s 
127). At the same time, courts in Abdulla and also more recently in Asda Stores Ltd v Brierley [2016] 
EWCA Civ 566, [2016] IRLR 709 have emphasised the many benefits to claimants of bringing equal 
pay claims before employment tribunals as opposed to before the civil courts (eg Abdulla, ibid, [6]). 
162 Again, this article was written before the General Election of 2017. 
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definition has been provided),163 and on the number of these contracts (with estimates 
currently ranging from 900,000 to 1.7 million).164 Second, despite various proposals 
suggested for regulation of this type of work, the resulting legislation is clearly 
limited.165 Section 153 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 defines 
a zero hours contract as ‘(a) the undertaking to do or perform work or services is an 
undertaking to do so conditionally on the employer making work or services available 
to the worker and (b) there is no certainty that any such work or services will be made 
available to the worker’. It inserts a new section 27A into the Employment Rights Act 
1996, making ‘exclusivity clauses’ in zero hours contracts henceforth unenforceable, 
and subsequent Regulations protect detriment or dismissal if a zero hours worker is 
punished for working in breach of such an exclusivity clause. 166  The reason for 
describing section 153 as minimal is because few employers prevent zero hours 
workers from working elsewhere anyway.167  
The conventional understanding of a zero hours contract is that there is no 
obligation on the employer to offer any work and the employer only needs to pay for 
hours actually worked as opposed also to when the worker is waiting to work. 
Freedland and Kountouris have written powerfully about the need to reformulate the 
goals of labour law, to fit the changing world of work, as ensuring a ‘fair’ 
mutualisation of risk in employment relationships. 168  Zero hours contracts would 
seem to run directly against this suggested goal, as they transfer a large amount, or 
even all, the risk from employers to workers.169 As the Government has indicated 
there will be no further legislation on zero hours work, this heightens the need to 
                                                 
163 Compare statutory definition (‘request or require’) to subsequent Government Guidance: 
http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/zero-hours-contracts-guidance-for-employers/zero-hours-
contracts-guidance-for-employers (last accessed 1 November 2016).  
164 For latest ONS figures and discussion: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/articles
/contractsthatdonotguaranteeaminimumnumberofhours/september2016 (last accessed 1 Nov 2016). 
165 Ranging from a ban, to providing a statutory right to request permanent work after a qualifying 
period, to providing anti-discrimination protection. (See also Zero Hours Contract Bill 2014-15.) 
166 Exclusivity Terms in Zero Hours Contracts (Redress) Regulations 2015. (Compare stronger draft 
reg 3.) 
167 CIPD (previous reports relied upon by Government), ‘Policy Report: Zero-hours and short-hours 
contracts in the UK: Employer and employee perspectives’ (December 2015): ‘[o]nly 6% of employers 
using zero-hours contracts even occasionally prohibit them from working for another company’, at 25.  
168 Freedland and Kountouris (2011), n 3 above, Conclusion: Mutualization and Demutualization in the 
Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations. 
169 Eg N. Pickavance, ‘Zeroed Out: The Place of Zero-hours Contracts in a Fair and Productive 
Economy’ (April 2014) 8. 
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consider the possibilities at common law.170 To combat this ‘demutualisation of risk’, 
the two pressing questions are: whether a duty of fairness could have any impact on 
the right of zero hours workers, first, to work and, second, to pay. One can see as well 
here the benefits of the suggested duty of fairness over the conventional trust and 
confidence analysis.171 
Government Guidance likens zero hours work to the modern day equivalent of 
‘piece work’.172 The leading case on piece work is the still the 1905 and 1906 case of 
Devonald v Rosser and Sons.173 Jelf J, and subsequently the Court of Appeal, held 
that Mr Devonald, a piece worker, in this ‘test case’, had an implied right to be 
provided with a reasonable amount of work while the contract lasted.174 As a piece 
worker has such an implied right, this would surely indicate that a zero hours worker 
too has a right to be provided with a reasonable amount of work.175 This could help to 
satisfy a concern of the Trades Union Congress as to under-employment of zero hours 
workers.176 On the other hand, the statements in Devonald were subject to ‘unless 
there is a custom to the contrary’.177 With zero hours contracts, the express terms of 
contract will always, or nearly always, negative any such implied right.178 But, as 
against that, a duty of fairness could certainly help ‘mollify’ the strictness of any such 
express term.179 There are already existing cases, even before explicit recognition of a 
duty of fairness, where courts have read clauses such as ‘casual as required’ subject to 
good faith, or subject to providing casuals with a reasonable share of work as it 
becomes available and subject to considering casuals ahead of offering work to 
newcomers.180 
Devonald is also interesting because it can be seen almost as a very early 
prototype of the suggested duty of fairness. It supports the idea of judicial 
intervention and creativity where there is ‘patent unfairness’ by employers. As stated 
                                                 
170 House of Lords Hansard, Volume 773 Column 1640 (29 June 2016). (Compare this to the Labour 
Party’s plans to ‘ban’ zero hours contracts in its manifesto for the General Election of 2017.) 
171 In terms of fit of language and more specifically, eg, if alleged inequity is with ‘regular’ workers, it 
was important in O’Brien, n 75 above, that the claimant was the same type of worker (permanent). 
172 Above n 163. 
173 [1906] 2 KB 728 (HC and CA). 
174 Ibid 742 (‘test case’: 729). 
175 Cf Ekwelem v Excel Passenger Service Ltd (2013) UKEAT/0438/12 [18] (but only a submission by 
counsel and not argued). 
176 ‘Ending the Abuse of Zero-hours Contracts’ (March 2014), 5. 
177 Devonald, n 173 above, 731 (and 733-735, 743). 
178 Eg from Pickavance, n 169 above: ‘[Y]ou acknowledge… the Company has no obligation to 
provide you with work…’   
179 Carmichael [1998] IRLR 301 (CA) [69] (but n 129 above, [21] and [29]). 
180 ABC News Intercontinental Inc v Gizbert (2006) UKEAT/0160/06/DM [21]; ibid and [104].   
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very memorably by Jelf J, whose judgment was subsequently upheld by the Court of 
Appeal, ‘[a]part from authority, it would be strange if such a right is not implied; for 
otherwise the bargain is of a very one-sided character.’ 181 Jelf J continued, ‘[t]he 
workman must be at the beck and call of the master whenever required to do so, and 
yet he cannot, though ready and willing to work and to earn his pay, earn a single 
penny unless the master chooses; and this state of things may go on for a period of 
nearly two months...’182 This ‘state of things’ can go on indefinitely for a zero hours 
worker. Moreover, Devonald supports the argument made in this article that a duty of 
fairness should also help the lower earning and lower status.183 Courts intervened in 
Mr Devonald’s case, when he was a ‘workman’, 184  which at the time was the 
equivalent of today’s statutory ‘worker’,185 which is relevant if zero hours workers 
generally lack the mutuality of obligation necessary to be considered an employee.186 
Devonald is normally seen to establish a separate rule for piece workers. An 
alternative argument for zero hours workers would be not to rely on their difference 
but to argue for assimilation. As suggested by Freedland, the House of Lords in Miles 
v Wakefield Metropolitan District Council applied the previously benevolent principle 
established in sick pay cases, that there is an implied right to payment if a worker is 
ready and willing to work, to deprive an employee of his right to payment when the 
employee was engaging in industrial action.187 The principle that the consideration for 
remuneration is being ready and willing to work rather than actual performance is 
normally thought to apply to salaried employees as opposed to those who work on 
task performance contracts. However, Lord Templeman did also state there was ‘no 
logical distinction’ between a ‘superintendent register’ salaried employee and a 
‘municipal dustman’ paid a wage.188 If there is no distinction between different types 
of worker when deciding what is the consideration for remuneration, this could be 
                                                 
181 Devonald, n 173 above, 731 (and in the Court of Appeal: 740 and 743). 
182 Ibid. 
183 Plus n 123. 
184 See S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment, 
and Legal Evolution (Oxford: OUP, 2005) chapter 2. 
185 Eg Truck Act 1940, s 1(3). (Employment Rights Act 1996, s 230(3)(b).) 
186Eg the Government’s preliminary definition: ‘a zero hours contract is an employment contract in 
which the employer does not guarantee the individual any work, and the individual is not obliged to 
accept any work offered’ (Consultation, December 2013, [11]). Cf CIPD, n 167 above: 67 per cent of 
employers apparently classify zero hours staff as employees. 
187 [1987] IRLR 193 (HL) ([49]; cf [27]). Freedland (2003), n 3 above, 219 (and 220-223). 
188 Ibid [15]. Moreover, as argued by Freedland (2003), n 3 above, 216-7, courts had already extended 
the cases on sick pay from salaried employees to other types of wage-earners. 
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used by zero hours workers to argue for payment also if they are ‘on call’.189 On call 
appears to mean when the worker or employee promises to remain ready and 
available for work.190 Going back to the duty of fairness, it could theoretically be 
described as ‘patently unfair’ that the employer gets something essentially for 
nothing: the zero hours worker, if not offered work, gives up their time for nothing.191 
Against this, one might run into the problem here of ‘constitutional principle’ from 
Johnson, as national minimum wage legislation makes clear that if a worker is at 
home or allowed to sleep at or near the place of work, they will not need to be paid 
the minimum wage unless actually working.192 A first response might be that the 
Johnson analogy is not necessarily apt, as unlike with unfair dismissal law, courts are 
indirectly told to take an interest, at common law, in low rates of pay by virtue of the 
contractual term imposed by legislation that workers will not be paid below the 
minimum wage. 193  A more radical response might be to try to challenge the 
‘constitutional principle’ in Johnson itself. Earlier scholarship on Johnson indeed did 
so (and with which this author is still inclined to agree).194 There might well be good 
motivation to do so now, in light of active deregulatory Governments. Regardless, one 
can imagine that in this type of scenario, when deciding if full contractual pay would 
be applicable, courts would also look to ‘recognised custom and practice’, 195 and 
certainly case law indicates that where payment is made, it tends to be for a lesser 
amount than either full contractual pay or the national minimum wage.196 
A final consideration would be if the contract were explicitly either to 
preclude payment for ‘on call’ time or to exclude the suggested duty of fairness. 
Statements by the House of Lords in both Malik and Johnson suggest that it would 
                                                 
189 Collins argues that the promise to remain available distinguishes zero hours contracts from casual 
work (‘Progress Towards the Right to Work in the United Kingdom’ in V. Mantouvalou (ed), The 
Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford: Hart, 2015) 236). (Cf n 163.) 
190 See eg C-151/02 Landeshauptstadt Kiel v Jaeger [2003] IRLR 804 (ECJ). Whittlestone v BJP Home 
Support Ltd [2014] IRLR 176 (EAT) emphasises there is no statutory definition of ‘on call’.   
191 Even though the claimant during his notice period had no right to payment in Sunrise Brokers LLP v 
Rodgers [2014] EWCA Civ 1373, [2015] IRLR 57, the situation there was very different: [26] ‘…he 
was not entitled to be paid because he was not ready and willing to work’ (and [30]).  
192 National Minimum Wage Regulations 2015, regs 27 and 32 (previous incarnations have led to a 
complicated jurisprudence on what it means to be ‘working’: eg Whittlestone, ibid). 
193 National Minimum Wage Act 1998, s 17. (Similarly, if equal pay is used as an example, Equality 
Act 2010, s 66: see n 161.) 
194 Above n 22. (Employment legislation in the UK is normally characterised as a ‘floor of rights’.) The 
latest edition of Deakin and Morris would seem still to support the earlier viewpoint: n 23 above, 459. 
195 Albeit, if equal pay is used as an example, this may not be helpful. 
196 As in O’Kelly v Trusthouse Forte plc [1983] IRLR 369 (CA), albeit this might be criticised. (In 
Whittlestone, eg, the employer tried, unsuccessfully, to pay a cheaper ‘fixed fee’ during the night.) 
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indeed be possible to ‘contract out’ of the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence.197 However, if Leggatt J was correct in Yam Seng that few companies, for 
reputational reasons, would seek to oust good faith, employers would surely be just as 
unlikely to commit explicitly to a statement that something as basic as fairness does 
not apply.198 ‘Despite the orthodox view being against it’, Collins has written recently 
in favour of non-derogability of the trust and confidence implied term.199 If the reason 
for saying that trust and confidence should be henceforth non-derogable is because it 
is ‘core’, a similar or possibly stronger argument can be made for the right to pay.200 
 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
Most labour law scholars currently are disillusioned with recent judicial decisions by 
the House of Lords and Supreme Court on the contract of employment. The argument 
made in this article was that although there are good reasons for disillusionment with 
the Johnson v Unisys progeny, there have been potentially some very positive 
developments for employees in recent decisions. These have been largely overlooked. 
On procedural fairness, the High Court has read in principles of ‘natural justice’ to the 
contract of employment, whereas both High Court and Court of Appeal decisions 
seem to see courts intervening in the employment relation also on the ground of 
substantive fairness. These developments could be seen as an extension of the implied 
term of trust and confidence or as the application of an obligation of good faith. 
However, it was contended here that a preferable portmanteau term would simply be a 
duty of fairness. In favour of that language, this wording has been expressly used in 
judicial dicta. This article explored the potential scope of an implied term of fairness. 
The problems of regarding legislation as the only answer to resolving problems of 
imbalance in the employment relationship were seen with the example of zero hours 
contracts.201 Legislative intervention here has been very limited, even though this type 
of work is almost universally seen as controversial. This article suggested different 
                                                 
197 Malik, n 12 above, [53]; Johnson, n 11 above, [18]. 
198 Yam Seng, n 124 above, [150]. 
199 Above n 44, 489 (and 483-490). 
200 Eg Cantor Fitzgerald International v Callaghan [1999] IRLR 234 (CA) [35]. 
201 This article was written before the General Election of 2017. Subsequently, it might however be 
added that legislation also may not always be the answer if it is more difficult for a minority 
Government to pass new laws.  
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ways in which the suggested duty of fairness could, if logically followed through, 
potentially also help zero hours workers. Ultimately, if a judge in 1905, before the 
‘employment law revolution’ was able to intervene on the grounds of ‘one-sidedness’, 
the available tools at common law are now much wider. 202 
 
                                                 
202 Devonald, n 173 above (and reference to ‘revolution’ in Johnson, n 11 above, [36]). 
 
